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Incentives in manufacturing:
the carrot and the stick
FREDERIC L. PRYOR

To what degree do different incentives substitute for or
complement each other in the manufacturing sector? Although this question has received considerable attention on
the plant level, relatively little information is available on
the subject for the U .S . manufacturing sector as a whole.
This study presents the results of a small survey designed
to elicit information so as to determine the contours of this
important problem.
The study focuses on both positive and negative incentives, that is, the carrot and the stick. Positive incentive
plans tie the compensation of the individual workers directly
with the work that is done and are of two basic types:
Individual incentives include piecework or various types of
bonuses for exceeding norms; Group incentives tie the bonus
to the performance of the group as a whole, for example,
profit-sharing plans, stock ownership plans, bonuses based
on aggregative indicators such as production or productivity .
Negative incentives are threats or actual use of punishment,
including financial penalties . These include the hiring of
additional supervisors to monitor the performance of workers or firing workers for poor performance . Although some
borderline cases can be cited for which it is difficult to
determine whether a particular incentive is positive or negative, in most cases the distinction should be relatively clear.
For the most part, both positive and negative incentives
are unilaterally imposed, that is management-controlled (but
often constrained by union contracts), in contrast to quality
circles and labor-management committees which are bilateral or cooperative efforts. I do not analyze these latter
measures because they raise a set of considerations far from
the major theme of this study .
Because both positive and negative incentives serve many
of the same ends, they can be substitutes for each other.
However, it is also possible that some incentives are complementary to each other. For instance, a high rate of supervision may lead to a high rate of firing (a conjecture not
supported by the data below) or individual and group incentives may accompany each other (a proposition which
does receive support) . Current economic theory tells us little
about such relations of complementarity or substitution ; such
an analysis must, therefore, be carried out primarily on an
empirical level.

The sample
A questionnaire consisting of about 65 questions was sent
in the summer of 1981 to a stratified random sample of
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2,050 U.S . manufacturing establishments and addressed to
the production manager.' The questions focused on hourly
plant employees and covered not only questions about incentives but also the opinions of the managers about the
effectiveness of particular incentives and about the changes
in the intensity of work .' Three hundred and sixty usable
replies were received, and the final sample represents plants
employing slightly less than 86,000 production workers (about
0.62 percent of total manufacturing workers) . Although the
survey is too small to offer conclusive results, a number of
propositions are generated which warrant more extensive
testing.
The characteristics of the plants in the sample parallel
reasonably closely the characteristics of the total universe
of U.S . manufacturing plants . The breakdown by two-digit
industries (Standard Industrial Classification) is roughly similar
to the United States as a whole.3 The size distribution of
plants is quite close to that of the total universe of American
plants with 100 workers or more ; however, workers in plants
with 50 to 99 employees are underrepresented by 40 percent.
Therefore, the results obtained should be considered only
as reflecting conditions in larger plants and more impersonal
working conditions . Geographical distribution of the plants
in my survey appears quite similar to the country as a whole 4
and the percentage of unionized workers appears roughly
the same as the entire manufacturing sector . In sum, although the sample is not perfect, it appears to reflect the
broad structure of the U.S . manufacturing sector except, as
intended, for very small plants .
The data collected differ from the compensation surveys
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in two important aspects.
The BLs data focus on a narrow range of incentives at the
level of the worker, whereas my data focus on a broad range
of incentives at the level of plant (for any production workers
within the plant) .

Positive incentives
Plant managers were asked if they had an incentive plan
system for a large proportion of their hourly plant workers
and, if so, which of a variety of specified methods they
used . Summary results concerning the usage of such plans
are presented in table 1 .
Problems in presenting the data arise because many plants
have more than one positive incentive plan ; and in the most
disaggregated classification (not given), those plants having
plans with positive incentives averaged 1 .4 different plans
per plant. In the more aggregated classification presented
in the table, roughly 30 percent of the plans report more
than one type of incentive plan, and 16 percent of all plants
(which cover 22 percent of the workers) have both personal
and group incentive plans. This multiplicity of various positive incentive plans within a single plant suggest that at the
plant level, such incentive systems are complementary . It
appears likely, however, that within the plant different groups
of workers may participate in different types of incentive

Table 1. Reported usage of Incentive plans for production
workers'
[In percent]

Plans

Plants

Productlon
workers

All plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

100

100

Plants with any incentive plans . . . . . . . .

54

59

Piecework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonuses for exceeding norms2 . . . .
other3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16
16
2

17
23
1

With personal incentive plans . . . . . . .

31

38

With group incentive plans . . . . . . . . .
Profit sharing or profit bonuses . . . .
Stock purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonuses based on aggregative indicators
(production, sales, shipments) .
Sharing cost savings, productivity

32
21
4
9

33
12
7
14

3

3

With miscellaneous plans . . . . . . . . . .

1

0

increases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

'The data for each category are presented net of all duplications . Hence, the sums of
the parts are larger than the reported total, with the differences reflecting the extent to
which various plants have several types of plans .
2These include plans based on "standard hour" or "standard day" as well as "individual production bonuses."
3These include bonuses for good attendance and base-pay increases for "good work."

schemes . For instance, assembly line workers might have
group bonuses, while those in subsidiary activities might
have individual bonuses.
If we examine the percentage of plants with positive incentive plans by industry, we find enormous variations in
both personal and group incentives . In trying to understand
this variation, I investigated a number of causal variables
and the results can be briefly summarized .
Influence of labor unions : There appears to be no significant relationship between the presence of a labor union
and the existence of personal incentive plans; however,
group incentive plans (especially profit-sharing or stockownership plans for blue-collar workers) are less likely
to be found in plants with labor unions . For example,
only 19 percent of plants with a majority of hourly workers which are unionized offered a group incentive plan,
compared with 44 percent of plants with a majority of
nonunion hourly workers .
e Size of plant: No interesting relationships were found
except that profit-sharing or profit-bonus plans are used
mostly in smaller plants .
Technology : I asked the production managers to classify
the technology of their plant into one of six types : traditional hand technology, general machining, assembly
line, continuous flow technology, machine tending, and
other. Only a few significant relations were found (for
example, plants using continual process technologies have
fewer personal incentive plans) . I found no evidence to
back Norma W. Carlson's contentions that personal incentive plans are less likely to be found in machine-paced
production, although the difference in our results may lie
in the fact that I tried to classify technology of individual

plants, while she characterized the type of technology
using an industrial classification .
Cost effectiveness of such plans: It is difficult to determine the cost effectiveness to the manufacturer of using
such plans . However, it is noteworthy that the rank order
of industries using piecework or personal incentive plans
is highly correlated with a similar rank ordering of industry in France .' This suggests that use of certain technologies in the production of particular types of goods
strongly influences the cost effectiveness of personal incentive plans .

Negative incentives

I asked each manager to designate the number of hourly
plant employees for each immediate supervisor . The results
(which can be obtained from the author) show a statistically
significant and positive relationship between the number of
workers per supervisor and the size of the plant. For instance, 21 percent of the plants with fewer than 100 workers
had 17 or more production workers per immediate supervisor, while 33 percent of plants with more than 500 workers
had this low a degree of supervision . Other factors such as
the degree of unionization, the type of technology, and so
forth were not found to be statistically related to the degree
of supervision .
Among the questions, I asked the production managers
to rate the effectiveness of various types of incentives for
increasing productivity . Of the 11 different measures provided in the list for that question, "more supervision of
workers" numbered among the least effective . However,
they did rank "more training of supervisory personnel" the
single most effective measure to achieve higher productivity. This suggests that the managers consider the positive
help that supervisors can give to their subordinates much
more effective in raising productivity than the police role
that the supervisors may play .
In addition, I asked the production managers to provide
the percentage of workers "fired in the past year for poor
job performance." The quantitative results examined by
industry are quite similar to previously unpublished BLS
surveys on the phenomenon .7
The most important causal factor underlying the rate of
firing appears to be the degree of unionization . For instance,
in plants with a majority of production workers unionized,
5 percent or more workers were annually fired in only 25
percent of the plants ; among plants with a majority of nonunion workers, this percentage was 44 percent . Such results
parallel the findings of Charles Brown and James L. Medoff,
and Richard B. Freeman9, who present quite different types
of evidence showing that unionization is inversely related
to labor turnover . This phenomenon is more dramatically
seen when we examine changes in the rate of firing poor
workers when the unionization status of workers has changed.
For instance, in my sample, the rate of firing poor workers
41
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increased over the last decade in 33 percent of the plants
which are not unionized now but were unionized a decade
ago; while this rate increased in only 20 percent of the plants
which are now unionized but which were not unionized a
decade ago. These results cannot tell us, however, whether
the cause of this inverse relationship between labor turnover
and unionization is due to the greater "voice" which union
workers receive (an explanation offered by Freeman [ 1980],
Brown and Medoff [ 1978] and others) or is due to union
efforts to reduce the rate at which workers are fired.
Are the two types of negative incentives complements to
each other (as are the two types of positive incentives) or
substitutes? At a particular time, such a relationship cannot
be easily seen ; however, the time series data suggest strongly
that they are substitutes . For instance, where the ratio of
supervisors to production workers has increased over the
last decade, the rate of firing increased in only 24 percent
of the plants ; where the degree of supervision has decreased
over the last decade, the rate of firing has increased in 42
percent of them . This inverse relationship between changes
in the degree of supervision and changes in the degree of
firing poor workers means that if plants cannot (either because of pressure from labor unions or other considerations)
encourage productivity by firing poor workers, they appear
to increase the rate of supervision instead.

Positive and negative incentives compared
Analyzing the degree to which positive and negative incentives are substitutes or complements raises some problems . Because the two types of negative incentives appear
to be substitutes for each other, aggregating them and comparing the results with the aggregate results of the positive
incentives does not seem a fruitful way of attacking the
problem. Instead, a more disaggregative approach is required .
The following is a comparison of some positive and negative incentives by presence of incentive plan and the number of production workers per immediate supervisor:
Presence of
personal incentive plan
Production workers per

supervisor
1 through 8 . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 through 16 . . . . . . . . . .
17 and over . . . . . . . . . . .

Presence of
group incentive
plan

Yes

No

Yes

No

37
24
42

71
97
57

37
46
20

71
75
79

x2 = 13 .5

x'-= 8 .6

The reported chi square statistics (x2) are uncorrected for
the size of the sample . Both of the calculated statistics are
significant at the .95 degree of confidence .
The above results suggest that there is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the use of incentive
plans (particularly, individual incentive plans) and close
supervision of workers . That is, the greater the use of in42

centive pay systems, the lower the degree of supervisor,
and vice versa. The relationship is revealed not only at a
single point in time but in other calculations where changes
in the use of positive incentives and changes in the degree
of supervision are examined over time .
Because intensive supervision and the rate of firing appear
inversely related to each other and because intensive supervision and the presence of positive incentives also appear
inversely related, we might expect to find a positive relationship between the rate of firing and the presence of positive incentives . Although this complementary relationship
can, indeed, be found for particular types of positive incentives (for example, piecerate) and the rate of firing, such
a positive relationship on an aggregative basis is not observed either at a single point in time or over time .
THIS SMALL SAMPLE SURVEY of the American manufacturing sector suggests that positive incentives (individual and
group plans) are complementary to each other, that major
negative incentives (the rate of supervision and the rate of
firing) are substitutes for each other, and that the positive
incentives and the rate of supervision are also substitutes
for each other.
While it would be possible to carry out a similar survey
on a much larger scale, more useful information could be
gained if both plant and individual data could be obtained .
That is, data on the types of workers within a given plant
covered by particular types of incentives would be more
useful than the plant data which I have collected. This information would provide a database permitting not only a
much closer look at the suitability of particular types of
incentives for particular types of workers but also would
permit a closer monitoring of some important managerial
efforts to increase productivity . Combined with data on plant
performance, we could also begin the important task of
assessing the effectiveness of particular types of
incentives .
El
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All comparisons with U .S . manufacturing plants as a whole are made
with the universe of plants in 1977, the last year for which detailed data
were available to me . Almost all such comparisons are made with the
census of manufacturing data for that year .
' The names of the plants were obtained from a direct mailing company
whose master list was reported to contain 86 percent of all U .S . plants .
To reduce the costs of the survey and to increase its coverage of total
workers, the questionnaires were sent only to plants with more than 50
reported employees .

I The latter results are reported in Frederic L. Pryor, "Some Economics
of Sloth," The Social Science Review, 5, No . I (Fall 1983), pp . 82-102 .

3The average coverage of production workers is 0.624 percent ; the
standard deviation of this ratio among the 20 two-digit manufacturing
industries is 0.242 . The most underrepresented industry in the sample is
leather and leather products (sic 31 ), followed by rubber and plastic products (sic 30), and then printing and publishing (sic 27). The most overrepresented industry is electrical machinery (sic 36), followed by stone,
glass and clay products (sic 32) and then tobacco and tobacco products
(sic 21) . The last industry, although overrepresented by the number of
workers, is represented only by one plant. In most of the statistical work
underlying this study, I combined the most underrepresented industries
into one group.
"The Northeast region is somewhat underrepresented and the Deep South
is somewhat overrepresented. Otherwise, the representation of the nine
census regions is very close to the national distribution .
'Norma W . Carlson, "Time rates tighten their grip on manufacturing
industries," Monthly Labor Review, May 1982, pp . 15-23.

'Of the five industries in both the United States and France with the
highest percentage of workers covered under such personal incentive plans,
four are the same: textile (sic 22), apparel (sic 23), transportation equipment (sic 37), and nonelectrical machinery (sic 35) . Of the five industries

in each nation with the least usage of such plans, four are the same :
chemicals (sic 28), rubber and plastic products (sic 30), food and tobacco
(sic 20 and 21 combined), and wood and furniture (sic 24 and 25 combined) . The French data come from Elisabeth Vlassenko, "L'enquete sur
la structure des salaires," Economie et statistique, No. 131 (March 1981),
pp . 23-35 ; and La structure des salaires dons l'industrie et les services
en 1978 in Les collection de PINSEE, Series M ., No . 90-91 (March 1981).
' A former plant manager raised an interesting objection at this pointnamely, that neither my data nor the Bt.s data on firing are very accurate
because of ambiguities arising from treatment of the probationary period
that each new worker serves . Before the end of this period . any worker
can be "released" with ease ; and it is unclear whether such actions are
included in either the BLS or my data on fired workers because personnel
on the probationary period are not, in a very real sense, regular workers.
"Charles Brown and James L. Medoff, -Trade Unions in the Production
Process," Journal of Political Economy, 86, No . 3 (June 1978), pp . 35578 .
`'Richard B. Freeman, "The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Markets:
Unions, Job Tenure, Quits, and Separations ." Quarterly Journal gj'Economics . 94, No . 4 (June 1980), pp . 643-74 .

Carnegie-Mellon honors BLS Commissioner
Commissioner of Labor Statistics Janet L . Norwood received an
honorary Doctor of Laws degree May 14 from Carnegie-Mellon
University . The citation read in part :
Economist and statistician, methodological innovator, manager
and government leader . . . As Commissioner of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in this its Centennial year, she is the guardian of
the nation's two most important statistical series-the unemployment rate and the consumer price index . . .
Her own words and actions present to us the model of a
dedicated civil servant and true professional : a commitment to objectivity and fairness, an insistence on candor at all times, protection of confidentiality, the constant pursuit of improvement and a
willingness to change, and finally the maintenance of the highest
standards of performance at all times . . .

